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A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON
CONTEMPT OF COURT IN WYOMING
Tori R.A. Kricken*
This article, first conceived on December 5, 2007, began its infancy in the
form of a Confidential Bench Memorandum for the Second Judicial District
in response to contempt proceedings initiated in rather infamous private road
litigation.1 Since that time, that original memo has gained some renown amongst
Wyoming trial judges as an attempt to clarify contempt proceedings, both civil
and criminal, and provide the judges with guidance. From there, it made the leap
into the world of Wyoming practitioners as a two-part article in Wyoming Lawyer
in the fall/winter of 2011.2 But, one last incarnation is required to update that
original 2007 version with current contempt matters and address issues heretofore
never imagined by this author, so as to provide an all-inclusive treatise—albeit a
short one—on the issue of contempt of court in Wyoming. Here goes.

I. Defining Contempt of Court:
Civil versus Criminal, Direct versus Indirect
A. Considering Civil Versus Criminal Contempt
“Contempt” is defined as the “act or state of despising; the condition of being
despised,” and, more relevantly, “[c]onduct that defies the authority or dignity of
* Thanks to Ronda Munger for her contributions to this article and for introducing me to
Katniss Everdeen. Thanks as well to the four judges who continue to inspire and guide me: Judge
Jeff Donnell, Judge Wade Waldrip, Judge Robert Castor, and Judge Ken Stebner.
See Goodman v. Voss, 248 P.3d 1120 (Wyo. 2011); Voss v. Goodman, 203 P.3d 415 (Wyo.
2009); Voss v. Albany Cnty. Comm’rs, 74 P.3d 714 (Wyo. 2003). See also Voss v. Albany Cnty.
Comm’rs, Albany County Docket No. 29691; Voss v. Stevens, Albany County Docket No. 28595;
Goodman v. Voss, Albany County Docket No. 30241, Goodman v. Voss, Albany County Docket
No. 31729.
1

See Tori R.A. Kricken, Contempt of Court: A Practical Guide for Lawyers and Judges, Part II:
Criminal Contempt, Wyo. Law., Dec. 2011; Tori R.A. Kricken, Contempt of Court: A Practical Guide
for Lawyers and Judges, Part I: Civil Contempt, Wyo. Law., Oct. 2011.
2
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a court or legislature.”3 Contempt is a “disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules
or orders of a legislative or judicial body, or an interruption of its proceedings by
disorderly behavior or insolent language.”4 Contempt charges may be brought
against parties to proceedings; lawyers or other court officers; jurors; witnesses; or
people who insert themselves in a case, such as protesters outside a courtroom.5
Recently, the Wyoming Supreme Court offered this guidance:
Historically, contempt of court meant contempt of a royal court
at common law, and the contempt power was employed by the
courts of early England as a means of punishing a presumed
contempt or disrespect of the king’s authority. The modern
concept of contempt encompasses a clear and open willful
disregard for the authority of the court, or any act calculated to
embarrass, hinder, or obstruct the court in the administration of
justice. Chief Justice Earl Warren once observed how the right
of courts to conduct their business in an untrammeled way lies
at the foundation of our system of government. A courts’ power
to punish for contempt is therefore a means of assuring the
enforcement of justice according to law.6
Contempt of court can be classified as either civil or criminal in nature and,
within each classification, either as direct contempt (committed in the court’s
presence) or indirect contempt (committed outside of the hearing or view of the
judge).7 The distinction between criminal and civil contempt is vitally important,
as it controls the procedures mandated for contempt actions. A reviewing court
will “determine the nature of a contempt based on the manner in which it occurred
and the reasons why a particular penalty was imposed.”8
3
Black’s Law Dictionary 336 (8th ed. 2004). See also In re Contempt of Dougherty, 413
N.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1987) (offering a thorough review of contempt).
4
Black’s Law Dictionary 336 (8th ed. 2004) (citing Edward M. Dangel, Contempt § 1, at
2 (1939)).
5
See In re Contempt of Dougherty, 413 N.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1987) (offering a thorough
review of contempt).

Weidt v. State, 312 P.3d 1035, 1040 n.3 (Wyo. 2013) (emphasis added) (some internal
citations omitted) (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 383 (1962); Edward Gregory Mascolo,
Procedures and Incarceration for Civil Contempt: A Clash of Wills Between Judge and Contemnor, 16
New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 171, 174 (1990); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1,
24, 72 S. Ct. 451, 462, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing In re Contempt of Haselhuhn, 740 P.2d 387, 390 (Wyo. 1987) (“It is undisputed
that a court’s power to punish for contempt is a necessary and integral part of the independence of
the judiciary.”)).
6

Swain v. State,, 220 P.3d 504, 507–08 (Wyo. 2009). See also Horn v. District Court, 647
P.2d 1368 (Wyo. 1982) (finding direct contempts are those committed in the court’s presence and
constructive contempts are those committed outside the hearing or view of the judge).
7

United Mine Workers of Am., Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Wyo.
1989) (quoting Anderson v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 660, 662 (Wyo. 1983)). See also Jensen v. MilatzoJensen, 304 P.3d 969, 971 (Wyo. 2013); Swain, 220 P.3d at 508.
8
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Generally speaking civil contempt is intended to compel a party to comply
with a lawful court order, while criminal contempt is punitive in nature and is
enforced to vindicate the authority of the law and the court. Civil contempt results
in wholly remedial punishment, serves only the purposes of the complainant,
and is not intended as a general deterrent to offenses against the public. “Stated
simply, the primary purpose of criminal contempt is to punish while the primary
purpose of civil contempt is to coerce.”9 The Wyoming Supreme Court has set
forth the following test for determining whether the punishment is remedial
or punitive:
[R]emedial punishment is punishment imposed because the
contemnor refused to do an affirmative act but which will be
discontinued as soon as the contemnor does the affirmative act
required; punitive punishment is punishment imposed because
the contemnor did something he was expressly ordered not to
do. Conversely, punitive punishment treats the contemnor’s
doing what he had been expressly told not to do as being in
defiance of the authority which issued the command.10
In essence, civil contempt is curative, seeking to enforce compliance with
a court order or to compensate an injured party.11 Civil contempt consists of
insubordinate or disobedient conduct that results in detriment to another party
in a civil proceeding, in essence, the refusal to do an act the court has ordered for
the benefit of a party.12 For example, the failure of a noncustodial parent to pay
child support, in violation of the court’s order, may amount to civil contempt.
Accordingly, the purposes of these contempt proceedings are compensatory and
coercive in seeking to force the offending party to comply with the court’s order
or to compensate the injured party for damage caused by the contempt. Thus,
where a contempt ruling imposes imprisonment conditioned upon compliance
with a court order requiring the contemnor to do some act, the failure of which
generated the finding of contempt, such contempt is considered civil in nature.
“When the petitioners carry ‘the keys of their prison in their own pockets,’
the action ‘is essentially a civil remedy designed for the benefit of other parties
and has quite properly been exercised for centuries to secure compliance with
judicial decrees.’”13

9
10

Horn v. Welch, 54 P.3d 754, 759 (Wyo. 2002) (internal citations omitted).
United Mine Workers of Am., Local 1972, 774 P.2d at 1279 (internal citations omitted).

Jensen, 304 P.3d at 971; Hamilton v. Hamilton, 228 P.3d 51, 53 (Wyo. 2010); Swain, 220
P.3d at 508.
11

12

See generally 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt § 4 (June 2014 update).

13

Connors v. Connors, 769 P.2d 336, 343 (Wyo. 1989) (internal citations omitted).
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Civil contempt differs from criminal contempt in that the court seeks only to
coerce the defendant to do what a court had previously ordered him to do.14 On
the other hand, “criminal contempt” consists of disobedient conduct committed
either in the presence of the court (direct criminal contempt) or directed to
the court but not committed in its presence (indirect criminal contempt).15
“Criminal contempt involves conduct that is calculated to embarrass, hinder,
or obstruct the administration of justice and is used to vindicate the authority
of a court and to punish the offending participant.”16 The consequence of such
conduct is a punitive sanction designed to vindicate the court’s authority for a
person’s noncompliance with a court order and, therefore, cannot be cured by the
accused.17 “Stated simply, the primary purpose of criminal contempt is to punish
while the primary purpose of civil contempt is to coerce.”18
In determining whether a contempt is criminal or civil, a reviewing court will
consider the following factors:
1. In what manner did the contempt happen, that is, did
the contemnor refuse to do an affirmative act or did the
contemnor do that which he was ordered not to do;
2. What was the substance of the proceeding;
3. What kind of punishment was imposed; and
4. For what reasons did the court impose that kind
of punishment.19
14

Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011) (internal quotation omitted).

Direct contempt is defined as “contempt (such as an assault of a testifying witness)
committed in the immediate vicinity of a court; esp., a contempt committed in a judge’s presence.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 337 (8th ed. 2004). Indirect contempt is defined as “[c]ontempt that is
committed outside of court, as when a party disobeys a court order.” Id.
15

16

17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt § 5 (June 2014 update).

17

Id.; see also Swain v. State, 220 P.3d 504, 508 (Wyo. 2009).
[W]here the imprisonment is for a definite term, is mandatory, and release is not
conditioned upon the contemnor’s compliance with any order of the court, the
contempt is criminal in nature and the rights of due process attach. Unlike civil
contempt where the court’s exercise of its contempt authority is for the purpose of
compelling action on the part of the contemnor for the benefit of the complainant,
the purpose of imposing a criminal contempt sanction is to punish the contemnor
for his actions or disobedience with a lawful order of the court to vindicate the court
and its authority.

Connors, 769 P.2d at 344.
18
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 228 P.3d 51, 53 (Wyo. 2010) (citing Horn v. Welch, 54 P.3d 754,
759 (Wyo. 2002)).

Stephens v. Lavitt, 239 P.3d 634, 638 (Wyo. 2010) (citing Munoz v. Munoz, 39 P.3d 390,
393 (Wyo. 2002)).
19
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Under the first factor, if the alleged contemnor refuses to perform an affirmative
act ordered by the court, the proceeding is considered civil in nature, whereas if
he does something he was ordered not to do, the proceeding often amounts to
criminal contempt.20 However, a court order need not be in place necessarily
for criminal contempt to occur, as in the case of disorderly, contemptuous, or
insolent behavior.21
The second factor addresses the “course of proceedings.”22 Wyoming Rule of
Criminal Procedure 42 identifies and governs criminal contempt proceedings.23
However, it is important to recognize that a court’s compliance with Rule 42
will not per se categorize the proceedings as criminal in nature.24 Indeed, a court
may, and often will, provide an accused contemnor with all the protections and
advisements provided by this rule without rendering the proceeding criminal in
nature.25 Likewise, a court’s failure to provide an alleged contemnor with Rule
42’s protections will not automatically render the contempt action civil in nature.
Under the third factor, the type of punishment imposed is a factor that
influences the nature of the contempt proceeding, as is a consideration of whether
the contemnor can purge any contempt.26 A court must consider whether the
punishment is “for a definite term,” generally indicating criminal contempt, or
whether it is conditional upon compliance with a court order, thereby indicating
civil contempt.27
The last factor requires consideration of whether the punishment is intended
as a deterrent versus a means to compel a party to obey the court’s order. If the
court aims to punish, it invokes its criminal contempt powers; if it aims to coerce
or compel, it utilizes its civil contempt authority.28 Notably, the third and fourth

20

See Stephens, 239 P.3d at 638.

21

See Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42 (2011).

22

Stephens, 239 P.3d at 638.

23

See Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42 (2011).

24

Stephens, 239 P.3d at 638.

Id.; see also Munoz v. Munoz, 39 P.3d 390, 393 (Wyo. 2002). Notably, even where a court
has referred to a contempt action as “criminal” and has utilized criminal contempt procedures, the
course of proceedings and other factors involved may render the proceeding civil in nature. Stephens,
239 P.3d at 638.
25

See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 228 P.3d 51, 53 (Wyo. 2010). And, although the Wyoming
Supreme Court generally considers a court’s assessment of attorney’s fees as “more punitive than
remedial in nature,” the court has allowed for the recovery of attorney’s fees in civil contempt
cases. Id.
26

27

See id. (citing Connors v. Connors, 769 P.2d 336, 344 (Wyo. 1989)).

See Stephens, 239 P.3d at 639 (citing Anderson v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 660, 662
(Wyo. 1983)).
28
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factors are “often denominated as the principal considerations in determining
whether a contempt proceeding is criminal or civil.”29
Of course, within some of these factors certain caveats exist. For example,
concerning the substance of the proceeding, the fact that an ex-husband, as a
private party, initiated a contempt proceeding against his former spouse did not
alter the ultimately criminal nature of the contempt proceeding.30 In that case,
the ex-husband asked the court to penalize the ex-wife for her conduct in selling
cattle in contravention of the court’s divorce order awarding cattle to husband as
his sole and separate property.31 Nor did the fact that the court ordered the ex-wife
to make the contempt payment directly to the private party (ex-husband) change
its criminal nature.32 Further, a court’s suspension of determinate punishment on
the condition of the contemnor’s obedience of court orders to pay child support
did not make the punishment/relief civil in nature.33 A suspended punishment,
without more, remains determinate.34
Ultimately, the categorization of contempt depends on substance, not form,
though the appearance of the process may suggest its underlying substance.
Generally speaking, where the course of a contempt proceeding reflects its civil
nature (e.g., being brought by a private party rather than the state, to enforce
compliance with the protections provided in a court order), then the contempt
itself will be deemed civil, rather than criminal, even if the court proceeds under
the criminal contempt rules and procedures.35

B. Considering Direct Versus Indirect Contempt
After parsing the nuances of civil versus criminal contempt, the distinctions
between “direct” and “indirect” contempt are much easier to tackle:
A direct contempt is an act that occurs in the presence of the
court and is intended to embarrass or engender disrespect for
the court. Shouting in the courtroom or refusing to answer
questions for a judge or attorney under oath is a direct contempt.

29

Id. at 638.

30

See Anderson v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 660 (Wyo. 1983).

31

Id.

32

Id.

See Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988); Garber v. United Mine Workers
of Am., 524 P.2d 578 (Wyo. 1974). See also United Mine Workers of Am., Local 1972 v. Decker
Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Wyo. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Stephens, at 638; Munoz
v. Munoz, 39 P.3d 390, 393 (Wyo. 2002).
33

34

Hicks, 485 U.S. at 634–35.

35

Stephens, 239 P.3d at 637–39.
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Indirect contempt occurs outside the presence of the court, but its
intention is also to belittle, mock, obstruct, interrupt, or degrade
the court and its proceedings. Attempting to bribe a district
attorney is an example of an indirect contempt. Publishing
material that results in a contempt charge is an indirect
contempt. Other kinds of indirect contempt include preventing
process service, improperly communicating to or by jurors, and
withholding evidence. One man was threatened with contempt
charges because he had filed more than 350 lawsuits that the
judge considered frivolous. Indirect contempt also may be called
constructive or consequential contempt; all three terms mean
the same thing.36
A court can constitutionally punish a directly contemptuous act in a summary
manner so long as the act is committed in the face of the court.37 And, conduct
appropriately may be identified as direct criminal contempt even though the
underlying action is of a civil nature. For example, where there is no lawful order
of the court with which a party has failed to comply and where the judge imposes
a fine for punitive reasons, rather than for the purpose of vindicating the rights
of a party, the contempt is criminal regardless of the underlying civil litigation.38
Again, the nature of the consequences, and the reasons they are imposed, often are
controlling in determining the character of the contempt before the court.

II. The Power of Contempt:
From Where Derives A Court’s Authority?
At the core of a court’s inherent authority is its right and ability to ensure
compliance with its orders. “The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all
courts of general jurisdiction in Wyoming.”39 The question, then, is not whether
Wyoming courts have the ability to wield contempt powers but, rather, how they
do so.

The Free Dictionary, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Contempt+of+Court
(last visited Jan. 2, 2015) (emphasis in original). Direct contempt also has been defined as “contempt
(such as an assault of a testifying witness) committed in the immediate vicinity of a court; esp., a
contempt committed in a judge’s presence.” Black’s Law Dictionary 337 (8th ed. 2004). Indirect
contempt has been defined as “[c]ontempt that is committed outside of court, as when a party
disobeys a court order.” Id.
36

37

Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42(b) (2011).

38

See Horn v. District Court, 647 P.2d 1368 (Wyo. 1982).

39
Swain v. State, 220 P.3d 504, 507 (Wyo. 2009). Except to the extent the Wyoming Rules of
Civil Procedure do not apply to certain proceedings in Circuit Court (and the resulting impact on
civil contempt), contempt powers apply to the Circuit Courts of Wyoming as well. See also Townes
v. State, 502 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1972); In re Estate of Mayne, 345 P.2d 790 (Wyo. 1959); Fisher v.
McDaniel, 64 P. 1056 (Wyo. 1901).
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Courts generally are empowered with the authority to declare contempt
under the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, which are worth quoting here
in their entirety. First, Rule 42 provides:
(a) Types. Criminal contempts of court are of two kinds, direct
and indirect.
(1) Direct. Direct contempts are those occurring in the
immediate view and presence of the court.40
(2) Indirect (Constructive). Indirect (constructive) contempts
are those not committed in the immediate presence of
the court, and of which it has no personal knowledge.41

40
Direct Contempt includes, but is not limited to the following acts: (A) Disorderly,
contemptuous or insolent behavior, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial
proceedings; (B) A breach of the peace, boisterous conduct, or violent disturbance, tending to
interrupt the business of the court; and (C) Refusing to be sworn or to answer as a witness. Wyo. R.
Crim. P. 42 (2011).
41

Indirect contempt includes, but is not limited to the following acts:
(A) Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty, by an attorney,
court administrator, sheriff, coroner, or other person appointed or elected to
perform a judicial or ministerial service;
(B) Deceit or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court by a party to an action
or special proceeding;
(C) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order, or process of the court;
(D) Acting as or assuming to be an attorney or other officer of the court without
such authority;
(E) Rescuing any person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order
or process of the court;
(F) Unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going to, remaining
at, or returning from the court where the action is to be tried;
(G) Any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court;
(H) Disobedience of a subpoena duly served;
(I)

When summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting to attend or serve, improperly
conversing with a party to an action to be tried at the court or with any person
relative to the merits of the action, or receiving a communication from a party
or other person in reference to it, and failing to immediately disclose the same to
the court;

(J) Disobedience, by an inferior tribunal or officer, of the lawful judgment, order,
or process of a superior court proceeding in an action or special proceeding,
in any court contrary to law after it has been removed from its jurisdiction, or
disobedience of any lawful order or process of a judicial officer; and
(K) Willful failure or refusal to pay a penalty assessment levied pursuant to statute.
Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol15/iss1/1
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(b) Direct Contempt Proceedings. A criminal contempt may be
punished summarily if the judge saw or heard the conduct
constituting the contempt and the conduct occurred in
the immediate view and presence of the court. It may be
dealt with immediately or, if done without unnecessary
delay and to prevent further disruption or delay of ongoing
proceedings, may be postponed to a more convenient time.42
(c) Indirect (Constructive) Contempt. A criminal contempt,
except as provided in the preceding subdivision
(b) concerning direct contempt, shall be prosecuted in the
following manner:
(1) Order to Show Cause. On the court’s motion or upon
affidavit of any person having knowledge of the facts,
a judge may issue and sign an order directed to the
accused, stating the essential facts constituting the
criminal contempt charged and requiring the accused to
appear before the court and show cause why the accused
ought not be held in contempt of court. The order
shall specify the time and place of the hearing, with a
reasonable time allowed for preparation of a defense.
(2) Motions; Answer. The accused, personally or by counsel,
may move to dismiss the order to show cause, move for
a statement of particulars or answer such order by way
of explanation or defense. All motions and the answer
shall be in writing unless specified otherwise by the
judge. An accused’s omission to file motions or answer
shall not be deemed as an admission of guilt of the
contempt charged.
(3) Order of Arrest; Bail. If there is good reason to believe
the accused will not appear in response to the order to
42

Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42(b) further requires
[t]he judgment of guilt of contempt shall include a recital of those facts upon which
the adjudication is based. Prior to the adjudication of guilt the judge shall inform
the accused of the accusation and afford the accused an opportunity to show why
the accused should not be adjudged guilty of contempt and sentenced therefor. The
accused shall be given the opportunity to present evidence of excusing or mitigating
circumstances. The judgment shall be signed by the judge and entered of record.
Sentence shall be pronounced in open court and reduced to writing, signed by the
judge and entered of record. Rule 32 shall not apply to judgment and sentencing for
direct contempt.

Id.
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show cause the judge may issue an order of arrest of the
accused. The accused shall be admitted to bail in the
manner provided by these rules.
(4) Arraignment; Hearing. The accused shall be arraigned
at the time of the hearing, or prior thereto upon the
request of the accused.43
(5) Disqualification of Judge. If the contempt charged
involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge
is disqualified from presiding at the hearing and shall
assign the matter to another judge.
(6) Verdict; Judgment. At the conclusion of the hearing the
judge shall sign and enter of record a judgment of guilty
or not guilty. In addition to the requirements of Rule
32, a judgment of guilt for contempt of court shall
include a recital of the facts constituting the contempt.
(7) Sentence. Unless an accused may be sentenced to the
penitentiary, a presentence investigation is not required
but may be ordered. In other respects, Rule 32 shall
apply to sentencing for contempt.
(d) Punishment. Punishment for contempt may not exceed the
criminal jurisdiction of the court. A sanction for contempt
of court may be imposed by a justice of the supreme court,
a judge or commissioner of a district court, a circuit court
judge or magistrate or a municipal judge.
(e) Jury Trial. Sentence to imprisonment upon a conviction on
a charge of criminal contempt shall not exceed a term of six
months unless the accused shall have been afforded the right
to trial by jury on the charge.

43

Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42(c)(4) further states:
A hearing to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused may follow a plea of
not guilty or may be set for trial at a later date or time. The judge may conduct a
hearing without assistance of counsel or may be assisted by the attorney for the state
or by an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose. The accused is entitled to
be represented by counsel, have compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses,
and may testify in his own defense. Unless the charged contempt is tried to a jury as
provided in subdivision (e), all issues of law and fact shall be heard and determined
by the judge.

Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol15/iss1/1

10

Kricken: A Comprehensive Treatise on Contempt of Court in Wyoming

2015

Contempt of Court in Wyoming

11

(f ) Other Criminal or Civil Remedies. An action for or
adjudication of criminal contempt shall not limit nor be
limited by any other criminal or civil remedies.44
Second, its companion, Rule 42.1, states, in part:
(a) Initiation of Proceedings. The court may initiate a proceeding
to impose a remedial sanction on its own motion or on the
motion of any person aggrieved by a contempt of court in
the criminal proceeding to which the contempt is related.
The proceeding shall be civil in nature and the Wyoming
Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply. 45
Rule 42.1 also grants the court authority 46 to initiate contempt proceedings
and provides the court with an array of remedial sanctions it can impose upon
a contemnor, after due process is afforded. The court is permitted to impose
imprisonment, additional court orders, or other remedial sanctions designed to
ensure compliance with the court’s orders.47 The court also may “order a person
found in contempt of court to pay a party for any losses suffered by the party as
a result of the contempt and any costs incurred in connection with the contempt
proceeding, including reasonable attorney’s fees.”48 That said, some specifics with
respect to a court’s specific authority to preside over contempt proceedings are
noteworthy as they apply to specific courts:

A. District Courts, Juvenile Courts, and District Court Commissioners
Although these procedural rules, in conjunction with Wyoming case law,
recognize an all-inclusive right of the district courts to enforce their court orders,
the Wyoming Legislature has, on occasion, specifically commented upon a court’s
contempt powers.49 For example, district courts have express contempt authority in
domestic relation cases regarding violations of orders concerning the care, custody
and visitation of the children.50 The Wyoming Legislature also has recognized
this authority in a multitude of other situations, including, but not limited to,
44

Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42.

45

Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42.1.

The rule extends this authority to justices of the supreme court, district judges, district
court commissioners, circuit judges, circuit court magistrates, and municipal judges. See Wyo. R.
Crim. P. 42.1(e).
46

47

Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42.1(b).

48

Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42.1(c).

49

Kovach v. State, 299 P.3d 97, 125 n.2 (Wyo. 2013).

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204 (2013); Walker v. Walker, 311 P.3d 170, 178 (Wyo. 2013)
(holding courts have inherent and statutory authority to enforce their orders in domestic relations
cases through contempt sanctions).
50
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failure to comply with court-ordered genetic testing;51 failure to pay a court-order
crime victim’s surcharge;52 duties of custodians to deliver the will of a deceased
to the court;53 and the requirement of a guardian to file a report regarding the
condition of the ward.54 Other examples of a district court’s contempt authority
include: the failure of jurors to attend court when summoned;55 the refusal of
a witness to answer or subscribe to a deposition when subpoenaed;56 and the
failure of a purchaser of realty to pay the purchase price.57 In fact, the Wyoming
Legislature took great care to clarify that courts have the power to punish for
contempt, even in the absence of an express statutory provision prohibiting the
offending conduct.58
The same holds true in a district court’s juvenile court capacity, where the
legislature repeatedly recognized the court’s contempt powers.59 Thus, a juvenile
court has the power to punish a party for contempt when the party fails to comply
with an order of the court.60 The juvenile court’s contempt authority is broad,
limited only by the sanctions that may be imposed.61
Contempt authority also has been extended to district court commissioners,
both expressly and impliedly. As far as the former, Wyoming statutes grant com
missioners the power to punish for contempt.62 Considering the latter, Wyoming
51

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-814 (2013).

52

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-40-119 (2013).

53

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-6-119 (2013).

54

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-109 (2013).

55

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-115 (2013).

56

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-12-106 (2013). See also West v. State, 311 P.3d 157, 161 (Wyo. 2013).

57

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-17-320 (2013).

58

Wyoming Statute § 6-1-102 provides:
(a) Common-law crimes are abolished. No conduct constitutes a crime unless it is
described as a crime in this act or in another statute of this state. This section
does not limit the power of the court to:
(i)

Punish for contempt or to employ any sanction authorized by law for the
enforcement of an order lawfully entered or a civil judgment or decree[.]

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-102 (2013).
59
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 14-6-242, 14-6-229(f )(vii) (2013); ELR v. State (In re Interest of
EWR), 902 P.2d 696 (Wyo. 1995).
60

See BW v. State (In re Interest of BD), 226 P.3d 272 (Wyo. 2010).

61

Id.

62

Wyoming Statute § 5-3-307 provides:
(a) Each district court commissioner shall have the powers in respect to every suit
or proceeding pending in the district court of the county for which he was
appointed, as follows:
(i)

If no judge qualified to hear or act in the proceeding or action is present in
the county for which such commissioner was appointed, to make any order
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precedent recognizes that commissioners have authority to preside over contempt
proceedings.63 District courts, however, are still tasked with the requirement of
reviewing and approving the orders made by their district court commissioners.64

B. Circuit Courts
The ability of the circuit courts to flex their contempt authority is much
cleaner in its statutory expression. Wyoming Statute Section 5-9-133 unambigu
ously specifies that a circuit court may “[p]reserve and enforce order in its
immediate presence and in the proceedings before it according to the Wyoming
Rules of Criminal Procedure for Circuit Courts 65 and punish for contempt as
provided therein[.]”66
Similarly, Wyoming Statute Section 1-21-901 provides:
(a) A circuit court judge may punish for contempt in the
following cases and no others:
(i) Persons guilty of disorderly, contemptuous and insolent
behavior toward a judge engaged in any judicial
proceeding, which tends to interrupt such proceedings
or impair the respect due the judge’s authority;

which a judge of the district court is authorized by law to make in chambers
and to hear and determine cases of mental illness or mental incompetency,
and to hold juvenile detention or shelter care hearings;
(ii) To make any order which a judge of the district court is authorized by law
to make in chambers, upon the written statement of such judge, filed with
the papers, that he is disqualified in such case;
(iii) To administer oaths;
(iv) To hear, try and determine all issues whenever an application shall have
been made for a change of judge;
(v) To take evidence and make findings, and report the same to the district court;
(vi) To take depositions;
(vii) To punish persons for contempts committed during hearings had before him.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-3-307 (2013) (emphasis added).
63

Gaines v. Doby, 773 P.2d 442 (Wyo. 1989).

64

Mau v. Stoner, 76 P. 584 (Wyo. 1904).

There are no “Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure for Circuit Courts” other than the
Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure.
65

66

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-133(i) (2014).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2015

13

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 15 [2015], No. 1, Art. 1

14

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 15

(ii) Persons guilty of resistance or disobedience to any
lawful order or process made or issued by the judge.67
The companion statutes outline the procedures required of circuit courts in
exercising their contempt powers, requiring certain due process protections.68
Thus, circuit courts must be cognizant of these additional limitations imposed
upon their contempt authority.

C. Administrative Agencies and Municipal Courts
Under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, administrative agencies
also have the authority to punish those who fail to comply with their orders.69
This authority has been recognized as applicable to various administrative
boards as well.70 However, agencies should be cautious because their contempt
authorities are limited by their roles prescribed by the separation of powers
doctrine: “An administrative agency is an arm of the executive branch of
government, and it, unlike the judicial branch, has no inherent power to
enforce discovery. Any such power that the administrative agency may possess is
derived entirely from legislative mandate incorporated in an appropriate statute.”71

67

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-901 (2014).

Those statutes provide: “No person shall be punished for contempt before a circuit court
judge until after an opportunity to be heard and for that purpose the judge may issue his warrant of
attachment to bring the offender before him.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-903 (2013). “The warrant
of commitment for contempt must set forth the particular circumstances of the offense or it is
void.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-905 (2013).
68

69

Wyoming Statute provides:
(c) In all contested cases, depositions and discovery relating thereto, agencies shall
have the authority to administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses
and require the production of any books, papers or other documents relevant
or material to the inquiry. In case of refusal to obey a subpoena issued by the
agency in a contested case, deposition or discovery relating thereto, to any
person, the district court for the district in which the hearing or deposition or
other proceeding is being conducted, or for the district where the person may
be served, may upon application by the agency issue to the person refusing to
obey the subpoena an order requiring the person to show cause for the refusal
or to appear before the agency or other person designated by it there to produce
documentary evidence if so ordered or there to give evidence touching the
matter in question. Any failure to show cause or obey the order of court may be
punished by the court as a contempt thereof.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107 (2013).
70
See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-21-801 (2014) (recognizing contempt powers of arbitration
board); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 11-36-110 (2014) (state board of agriculture); Wyo. Bd. Of Cont.
Legal Ed. R. 11 (recognizing contempt powers of board of continuing legal education); Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 35-11-112 (2014) (recognizing contempt power of environmental quality council).

In re Contempt Order Issued Against Anderson, 765 P.2d 933, 935–36 (Wyo. 1988) (citing
Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894); Hupp v. Emp’t Sec. Comm’n of
71
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Finally, municipal courts also hold comparable contempt powers within their
jurisdictional limits. The Wyoming Legislature has identified the circumstances
in which municipal courts have contempt authority, as well as specific procedural
and remedy-related limitations.72 Additionally, court rule includes municipal
contempt powers within those possible, stating: “Punishment for contempt may
not exceed the criminal jurisdiction of the court. A sanction for contempt of court
may be imposed by a justice of the supreme court, a judge or commissioner of a

Wyo., 715 P.2d 223 (Wyo. 1986); United States v. Sec. State Bank and Trust, 473 F.2d 638 (5th
Cir. 1973)). For example, the Wyoming statute that authorizes discovery in contested cases before
administrative agencies states:
(c) In all contested cases, depositions and discovery relating thereto, agencies shall
have the authority to administer oaths and affirmations, subpoena witnesses and
require the production of any books, papers or other documents relevant or
material to the inquiry. In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued
by the agency in a contested case, deposition or discovery relating thereto, to
any person, the district court for the district in which the hearing or deposition
or other proceeding is being conducted shall upon application of the agency
issue to the person refusing to obey the subpoena an order requiring the person
to appear before the agency or other person designated by it there to produce
documentary evidence if so ordered or there to give evidence touching the matter
in question. Any failure to obey the order of court may be punished by the court
as a contempt thereof.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-107(c) (2014).
72

Wyoming Statute § 5-6-301 provides:
(a) A person convicted before a municipal judge shall be fined and imprisoned
as provided by ordinance. Except as provided by W.S. 15-1-103(a)(xli) or
subsection (c) of this section, no fine shall exceed seven hundred fifty dollars
($750.00), and no imprisonment shall exceed six (6) months.
(b) The municipal judge shall punish for contempt in the same manner as district
court. Before any person is imprisoned for the willful refusal to pay a fine, the
court shall determine whether the defendant has an ability to pay or that a
reasonable probability exists that the defendant will have an ability to pay.
(c) A district court has jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief and to impose any civil
penalty authorized by ordinance adopted pursuant to W.S. 15-1-103(a)(xlvi).

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-6-301 (2013).
Further, Wyoming statute § 5-6-202 provides:
(b) The municipal judge shall enforce due obedience to all orders, rules and
judgments made by him. The judge has the same power as the district court in
the issuance of warrant, search warrant, subpoena or other necessary process and
may fine or imprison for contempt offered to him or to process issued by him in
the same manner and to the same extent as the district court. Before any person is
imprisoned for the willful refusal to pay a fine, the court shall determine whether
the defendant has an ability to pay or that a reasonable probability exists that the
defendant will have an ability to pay.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-6-202 (2014). See also State ex rel. Hoke v. Owens, 733 P.2d 240 (Wyo. 1987);
Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts over DWUI after 1982, Wyo. Op. Atty. Gen. 44 (1982); Wayne
R. Johnson, North Dakota’s New Contempt Law: Will it Mean Order in the Court?, 70 N.D. L. Rev.
1027 (1994).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2015

15

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 15 [2015], No. 1, Art. 1

16

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 15

district court, a circuit court judge or magistrate or a municipal judge.”73 These
powers, however, are appealable to a district court, subject to an arbitrary and
capricious standard of review.74

III. The Origination of Contempt Proceedings: Who May Initiate?
Having established the authority of the various courts and agencies to punish
or coerce, by use of their contempt powers, one might be called upon to query
how contempt proceedings commence. In contrast to criminal contempt cases,
civil contempt proceedings occur between the original parties and are considered
merely a facet of the original cause of action.75 As a result, these proceedings are
instituted and addressed as part of the underlying case.76 To be authorized to
initiate civil contempt proceedings, the complainant must meet two requirements:
(1) possession of a legally recognized interest in the court order (for instance,
as the party for whose benefit the judgment or order was made) and (2) injury
caused by the alleged violation.77 Under these circumstances, the complainant
can initiate a civil contempt action, generally by virtue of seeking an order to show
cause why the allegedly non-complying party should not be held in contempt for
failure to abide by court order.
Meanwhile, conduct amounting to criminal contempt is considered a crime
and is prosecuted to preserve the court’s power and to vindicate the court’s dignity.
A criminal contempt prosecution “is between the public and the contemnor and
is a separate and independent proceeding from, and is not a part of, the original
case in which the contempt arose—it is instituted, tried and treated as a distinct
criminal action.”78 Accordingly, “[a] private party has no standing to prosecute an
action for criminal contempt.”79 Such actions must be brought by the court, of its
own accord, or prosecuted by the State, as independent criminal proceedings.80

73

Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42.

74

Badley v. City of Sheridan, 440 P.2d 516 (Wyo. 1968).

75

Swain v. State, 220 P.3d 504, 508 (Wyo. 2009).

76

Id.

77

17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt § 150 (June 2014 update).

Swain, 220 P.3d at 508 (citing Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,
444–51 (1911)).
78

79

17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt § 151 (June 2014 update).

See Garber v. United Mine Workers of Am., 524 P.2d 578, 579 (Wyo. 1974). However,
criminal contempt proceedings may be prosecuted by private attorneys appointed by the court for
that purpose. 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt § 152 (June 2014 update). Wyoming Rule of Criminal
Procedure 42(c), which applies to indirect criminal contempt, states: “The judge may conduct
a hearing without assistance of counsel or may be assisted by the attorney for the state or by an
attorney appointed by the court for that purpose[.]” Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42.1(c).
80
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IV. Step By Step: Mandatory Contempt Procedures
Regardless of whether contempt proceedings are civil or criminal, or
direct or indirect, in nature, courts must follow certain procedures to ensure
proper procedural due process protections of those involved.81 At the heart of
constitutional notions of procedural due process lie the concepts of (1) notice and
(2) the opportunity to be heard.82 When a court fails to follow proper procedures,
it risks reversal 83 and, perhaps more importantly, the diminution of the actual and
perceived authority of the court to govern the proceedings before it.84
Again, although the requirements for civil contempt proceedings are less than
those associated with criminal contempt, Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure
42.1 is relevant to civil contempt in criminal cases and outlines the necessary
requirements of those actions.85 So, while civil contempt proceedings necessarily
permit fewer due process procedural protections than criminal contempt cases,
that is not to say that those constitutional notions are to be ignored.86 These
mandatory procedures encompass the right to a hearing and an opportunity to
interpose a defense.87 Additional issues regarding constitutional due process,88 and
other constitutional concerns,89 will be addressed later in this article.
In contrast, “[c]riminal contempt is ‘a crime in every fundamental respect’ and
a conviction for criminal contempt is indistinguishable from an ordinary criminal
conviction.”90 Because of the punitive nature of criminal contempt proceedings
and the associated punishment, a court must protect the defendant’s due process

81
Notably, the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, Wyoming Rules of Evidence, and
Wyoming Code of Civil Procedure govern in criminal cases relative to proceedings for contempt.
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-403 (2013). However, the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, other than
those with respect to privileges, are held not to apply to contempt proceedings in which the court
may act summarily. See Wyo. R. Evid. 1101(b)(4).
82

Tracy, Green & Co. v. Warner, 704 P.2d 1306 (Wyo. 1985).

United Mine Workers of Am., Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274
(Wyo. 1989).
83

84
See Horn v. Welch, 54 P.3d 754 (Wyo. 2002). At the very least, a court, in every instance
of contempt, should fully explain the nature and effect of a finding of contempt. See Haselhuhn v.
State, 740 P.2d 387 (Wyo. 1987).
85

Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42.1

86

See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).

See GGV v. JLR, 105 P.3d 474, 480 (Wyo. 2005) (finding civil contempt due process rights
include “ample notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a reasonable opportunity to employ counsel to
represent her if she so desired”).
87

88

See infra notes 182–85 and accompanying text.

89

See infra notes 176 –236 and accompanying text.

BW v. State (In re Interest of BD), 2010 WY 18, ¶ 3, 226 P.3d 272, 273 (Wyo. 2010)
(quoting Swain v. State, 220 P.3d 504, 508 (Wyo. 2009)).
90
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rights.91 Thus, criminal contempt proceedings are independent criminal actions
and should be conducted accordingly.92
Above all, the Wyoming Supreme Court has repeatedly enforced the
requirement that criminal contempt proceedings be treated as independent and
separate proceedings, affording an alleged contemnor with full due process rights.93
Failure to adhere to the “separate and independent action” rule constitutes a fatal
jurisdictional defect, which renders any finding of contempt void.94 Additionally,
when imposing criminal contempt, a court also must comply with the due process
requirements of Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 42, quoted herein.95
The requirements of that rule differ based upon the type of criminal
contempt—direct versus indirect. Because the rule provides distinct procedures
that must be followed for direct and indirect contempt, a court must subcategorize
its criminal contempt proceedings.96 Direct criminal contempt proceedings are
those aimed at punishing conduct that occurs in the presence of the court.97
Even where the underlying action is civil in nature, contempt proceedings can
be criminal where the punishment is intended for punitive reasons.98 In such
instances, Rule 42 permits, or requires, the application of certain procedures.99
Thus, to summarize, these direct contempt procedures generally require a trial
court to:
91

Id.

92

Garber v. United Mine Workers of Am., 524 P.2d 578 (Wyo. 1974).

See In re BD, 226 P.3d at 274; Swain, 220 P.3d at 508–09; United Mine Workers of
Am., Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 1283–84 (Wyo. 1989); Garber, 524 P.2d at
579–80; Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444–45 (1911).
93

94

In re BD, 226 P.3d at 274.

Horn v. Welch, 54 P.3d 754, 760 (Wyo. 2002). In 1992, Rule 42 superseded Wyoming Rule
of Criminal Procedure 41(b), which had previously addressed contempt proceedings. However, the
Wyoming Supreme Court has noted that “nothing in the language of Rule 42 . . . mandate[s] a different
result [than Rule 41(b)].” Swain, 220 P.3d at 509 n.4.
95

96

Horn, 54 P.3d at 759.

97

Horn v. District Court, 647 P.2d 1368, 1373 (Wyo. 1982).

98

Id. at 1373–74.

99

Rule 42(b) provides:
(b) Direct Contempt Proceedings. A criminal contempt may be punished
summarily if the judge saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and
the conduct occurred in the immediate view and presence of the court. It may
be dealt with immediately or, if done without unnecessary delay and to prevent
further disruption or delay of ongoing proceedings, may be postponed to a more
convenient time. The judgment of guilt of contempt shall include a recital of
those facts upon which the adjudication is based. Prior to the adjudication of
guilt the judge shall inform the accused of the accusation and afford the accused
an opportunity to show why the accused should not be adjudged guilty of
contempt and sentenced therefor. The accused shall be given the opportunity to
present evidence of excusing or mitigating circumstances. The judgment shall be
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(1) Inform the accused of the accusation against him;
(2) Give him an opportunity to show why he should not be
held in contempt; and
(3) Allow him to present evidence of mitigating circumstances.100
Notably, as addressed elsewhere in this article, the United States Supreme
Court has recognized that an indigent defendant subject to criminal contempt
proceedings (other than summary proceedings) may have a right to stateappointed counsel.101
Finally, “[u]pon an adjudication of guilt, the sentence for direct contempt
is to be pronounced in open court and reduced to writing.”102 In addressing
the sufficiency of the documentation involved (e.g., the contempt order), the
court must enter a written order stating “all the essential facts on which the
order of contempt is based.”103 This writing requirement holds true even where
the contempt occurred in the presence of the court, so as to protect the appeal
rights of the contemnor.104
In contrast to the due process protections generally afforded a criminal
defendant, the law also recognizes that a judge may punish a contemnor
“summarily” if that judge saw or heard the conduct constituting direct
contempt.105 “One charged with committing a direct contempt in the presence
of the court is not generally entitled to be heard in his or her own defense;
no constitutional rights are infringed by refusing a hearing and punishing
summarily.”106 In these cases, the contemnor has no right to counsel; no right
to indictment or trial by jury; and no right to technical pleadings.107 “Where

signed by the judge and entered of record. Sentence shall be pronounced in open
court and reduced to writing, signed by the judge and entered of record. Rule 32
shall not apply to judgment and sentencing for direct contempt.
Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42(b).
100

See Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42(b); see also Horn v. Welch, 54 P.3d 754, 759 (Wyo. 2002).

See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011) (citing United States v. Dixon, 509
U.S. 688, 696 (1993); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925)).
101

102

Horn, 54 P.3d at 759.

Badley v. City of Sheridan, 440 P.2d 516, 518 (Wyo. 1968); see also Wyo. R. Crim. P.
42(b); Horn,, 647 P.2d at 1376–77; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-905 (2013) (governing circuit courts).
103

104

Badley, 440 P.2d at 518.

Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42(b); see also 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt §§ 169, 193 (June 2014 update);
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-904 (2013) (allowing summary proceedings in circuit courts).
105

106

17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt § 170 (June 2014 update).

107

Id. §§ 176, 193.
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a direct contempt occurs in the presence of the court, the court should usually
act promptly to impose sanctions.”108 However, if the court delays in imposing
punishment, then “[d]ue process requires that the contemnor’s rights to notice
and a hearing be respected[.]”109 Thus, a court making a summary disposition
must observe procedural safeguards.110
Meanwhile, indirect criminal contempt, for conduct occurring outside the
presence of the court, requires separate procedures to protect the constitutional
due process rights of the alleged contemnor.111 Essentially, a court must arraign

108
Id. § 170. “When a direct contempt is committed in the immediate presence of the court,
summary adjudication without pleading, affidavit, or formal charges is constitutionally permissible.
When the misconduct occurs in open court, the affront to the court’s dignity is widely observed,
justifying summary contempt procedures.” Id. § 191.
109

Id. § 170.

110

Townes v. State, 502 P.2d 991 (Wyo. 1972).

111

Again, Rule 42(c) provides:
(c) Indirect (Constructive) Contempt Proceedings. A criminal contempt, except as
provided in the preceding subdivision (b) concerning direct contempt, shall be
prosecuted in the following manner:
(1) Order to Show Cause. On the court’s motion or upon affidavit of any
person having knowledge of the facts, a judge may issue and sign an order
directed to the accused, stating the essential facts constituting the criminal
contempt charged and requiring the accused to appear before the court and
show cause why the accused ought not be held in contempt of court. The
order shall specify the time and place of the hearing, with a reasonable time
allowed for preparation of a defense.
(2) Motions; Answer. The accused, personally or by counsel, may move to
dismiss the order to show cause, move for a statement of particulars or
answer such order by way of explanation or defense. All motions and the
answer shall be in writing unless specified otherwise by the judge. An
accused’s omission to file motions or answer shall not be deemed as an
admission of guilt of the contempt charged.
(3) Order of Arrest; Bail. If there is good reason to believe the accused will not
appear in response to the order to show cause the judge may issue an order
of arrest of the accused. The accused shall be admitted to bail in the manner
provided by these rules.
(4) Arraignment; Hearing. The accused shall be arraigned at the time of the
hearing, or prior thereto upon the request of the accused. A hearing to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused may follow a plea of not
guilty or may be set for trial at a later date or time. The judge may conduct
a hearing without assistance of counsel or may be assisted by the attorney
for the state or by an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose. The
accused is entitled to be represented by counsel, have compulsory process
for the attendance of witnesses, and may testify in his own defense. Unless
the charged contempt is tried to a jury as provided in subdivision (e), all
issues of law and fact shall be heard and determined by the judge.
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an individual charged with indirect criminal contempt so as to comply with
the adequate notice criteria of Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and
advise the defendant of his attendant rights.112 In summary, the Wyoming rules
governing indirect criminal contempt require other procedural safeguards.113
“[I]ndirect contempt proceedings can only be prosecuted upon notice stating the
time and place of the hearing and allowing a reasonable time for preparation of a
defense.”114 A defendant must be afforded reasonable time to prepare his defense
to allegations of indirect criminal contempt.115
Wyoming circuit courts, one should recall, face limitations in their contempt
powers, as outlined in Wyoming Statutes Sections 1-21-901 through 1-21-909.116
While those statutes do not offer many procedural differences as compared to
Rule 42, they limit a circuit court’s authority to punish for contempt.117
Finally, because criminal contempt is a crime, the State carries the burden of
proving an accused’s guilt “by establishing every essential element of the crime.”118
This statement necessarily begs the question: What are the elements and the
burdens of proof regarding the various forms of contempt?

(5) Disqualification of Judge. If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or
criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the hearing
and shall assign the matter to another judge.
(6) Verdict; Judgment. At the conclusion of the hearing the judge shall sign
and enter of record a judgment of guilty or not guilty. In addition to the
requirements of Rule 32, a judgment of guilt for contempt of court shall
include a recital of the facts constituting the contempt.
(7) Sentence. Unless an accused may be sentenced to the penitentiary, a
presentence investigation is not required but may be ordered. In other
respects, Rule 32 shall apply to sentencing for contempt.
Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42(c).
112

Skinner v. State, 838 P.2d 715 (Wyo. 1992).

The safeguards require the court to: (1) issue an order directed to the accused stating the
essential facts supporting the contempt charge, informing the contemnor of the criminal nature of
the charge, and requiring the contemnor to appear and show cause why he should not be held in
contempt; (2) provide an arraignment for the purpose of entering a plea; (3) provide a hearing to
determine guilt or innocence; (4) issue a judgment of guilty or not guilty; and (5) in the event of a
judgment of guilt, issue a judgment reciting the facts constituting the contempt. See Wyo. R. Crim.
P. 42(c); see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-21-901–909 (2011) (governing circuit courts).
113

Horn v. Welch, 54 P.3d 754, 760 (Wyo. 2002); United Mine Workers of Am., Local 1972
v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 1282 (Wyo. 1989).
114

115

Townes, 504 P.2d at 46–47.

116

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-21-901–909 (2013).

117

Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42(b); see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-21-901–909 (2011).

118

ELR v. State (In re Interest of EWR), 902 P.2d 696, 700 (Wyo. 1995).
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V. Elements and Burden of Proof for Contempt
A. Civil Contempt
Undoubtedly, one alleging contempt holds the burden of proving that the
alleged contemnor violated a court order. However, the degree of that burden was
historically unclear. In 2011, the Wyoming Supreme Court declined to address
the burden of proof for civil contempt,119 stating:
It is clear that the district court found that Mr. Walters had
proved the elements of compensatory civil contempt by clear
and convincing evidence. In this appeal, both parties accept
that clear and convincing requirement . . . . We will accept that
requirement for purposes of this case, cautioning that research of
our jurisprudence has not located any decision preferring “clear
and convincing” over “preponderance.” A definitive holding on
that issue must await another day.120
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s opinion suggested that the lesser standard
may be appropriate in contrast to federal court opinions on the topic, which
required clear and convincing evidence.121 And, in fact, the bulk of recent case
law from other jurisdictions also suggests that the clear and convincing standard
is applied more often than the preponderance standard.122
Since that time, the court has clarified the “clear and convincing” standard is
applicable to civil contempt motions.123 Clear and convincing evidence, of course,
is that kind of proof that would persuade the trier of fact that the truth of the
contention is highly probable.124 In 2014, the Wyoming Supreme Court stated:
Like a majority of jurisdictions, we agree civil contempt must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence. Clear and convincing
evidence is evidence that would persuade a finder of fact that the
truth of the contention is highly probable. The elements of civil

119

See Walters v. Walters, 249 P.3d 214, 227 (Wyo. 2011).

Id. (internal citations omitted). The court also cited Doug Rendleman, Compensatory Contempt:
Plaintiff’s Remedy When a Defendant Violates and Injunction, 1980 U. Ill. L.F. 971, 980–81 (1980), for a
discussion on the burden of proof in compensatory civil contempt cases. 249 P.3d at 227 n.1.
120

121

Skinner v. Lampert, 457 F.Supp.2d 1269 (D. Wyo. 2006).

See, e.g., Bradford v. State, 21 A.3d 123 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011); Crick v. Starr, No. 08 MA
173, 2009 WL 4895270 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2009); Porter v. Porter, No. 07CA3178, 2008 WL
4717164 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2008); Johnson & Placke v. Norris, No. 38-300 (La. App. 2d Cir. May
12, 2004); 874 So.2d 340.
122

123

Shindell v. Shindell, 322 P.3d 1270, 1274–75 (Wyo. 2014).

124

Meckem v. Carter, 323 P.3d 637, 644 (Wyo. 2014).
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contempt include: 1) an effective court order that required certain
conduct by the alleged contemnor; 2) the contemnor had knowledge
of the order; and 3) the alleged contemnor disobeyed the order. Once
those elements are proven, the burden shifts to the person charged
with contempt to show he or she was unable to comply.125
Thus, to prevail in civil contempt proceedings, the one alleging the contempt
must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the alleged contemnor had
knowledge of an existing and effective court order and disobeyed that order.
Once proven, to avoid being held in civil contempt of court, the accused must
demonstrate that he was unable to comply with the court’s order.

B. Criminal Contempt
Regarding criminal contempt, the Wyoming Supreme Court has opined that
criminal contempt is a crime in every fundamental respect, and the State therefore
carries the burden of proving every element of a charge of criminal contempt
beyond a reasonable doubt.126 Accordingly, the State has the burden of proving
that the alleged contemnor willfully disobeyed the district court’s order.127
Further, the Wyoming Supreme Court has clarified:
We have also recognized that “criminal contempt necessarily
implies an element of intent that must be proved before a
contempt citation can be upheld.” Rule 42 simply defines the
relevant form of indirect criminal contempt as “[d]isobedience
of any lawful judgment, order, or process of the court.” The
rule is procedural in nature, and does not purport to define the
elements of criminal contempt.
“Disobedience,” however, means a refusal or failure to obey.
Judge Cardozo once quipped that “[d]isobedience is impossible
unless there is something to be obeyed.
Federal courts have therefore rejected findings of contempt
when it was impossible to comply with the terms of an order,
or when an order contained no legal commands. Mistake,
Shindell, 322 P.3d at 1274 (emphasis added) (citing 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt § 183
(2014); TMC v. State, Dep’t of Family Servs. (In re ARC), 258 P.3d 704, 708 (Wyo. 2011); MN v.
State, Dep’t of Family Servs. (In re Interest of MN), 78 P.3d 232, 234 (Wyo. 2003); United States
v. Ford, 514 F.3d 1047, 1051 (10th Cir. 2008)).
125

126
Weidt v. State, 312 P.3d 1035 (Wyo. 2013); ELR v. State (In re Interest of EWR), 902 P.2d
696 (Wyo. 1995). See also G. R. B., Degree of Proof Necessary in Contempt Proceedings, 49 A.L.R. 975
(orig. pub. in 1927).
127

Weidt, 312 P.3d 1035.
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inadvertence, or neglect are likewise not “disobedience” in the
context of criminal contempt.
Most of the federal circuits require proof of a willful violation
of a reasonably specific order to establish criminal contempt for
disobedience of a court order. We believe the majority federal
rule is the correct approach. It also provides much-needed
clarification in an area of the law that has “bedeviled” courts,
judges, lawyers, and legal commentators. We conclude that
indirect criminal contempt for disobedience of a court order requires
the State to prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) a
reasonably specific order; (2) violation of the terms of the order; and
(3) willful intent to violate the order.128
As to the third element, a willful intent to violate the court’s order, such
willfulness must consist of a “deliberate or intended violation,” or a “volitional
act done by one who knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct is
wrongful.”129 The court recognized, however, that a contemnor’s state of mind
“cannot usually be proven directly, and must instead be ascertained from all the
acts, words, and circumstances surrounding the events.”130

VI. Remedies for Civil and Criminal Contempt:
Coercion Versus Punishment
Because it is determinative of the classification of contempt as civil or
criminal in nature, Wyoming courts often are called upon to address the available
remedies, or penalties, for contempt proceedings.131 Thus, a reviewing court must
“determine the nature of a contempt based on the manner in which it occurred
and the reasons why a particular penalty was imposed.”132 This necessarily leads
to a consideration of what types of remedies a court may order for the various
contemptuous acts:

Weidt, 312 P.3d at 1041– 42 (emphasis added) (some internal citations omitted) (quoting
Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42(a)(2)(C); Standard Chems. & Metals Corp. v. Waugh Chem. Corp., 131 N.E.
566, 567 (1921).) (citing Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827
n.3 (1994)). Accord 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (2013) (federal courts may punish by fine or imprisonment
contempt consisting of “[d]isobedience or resistance to [a federal court’s] lawful writ, process, order,
rule, decree, or command”).
128

129

Id. at 1043.

130

Id. (internal citations omitted).

The type of punishment to be imposed is the factor that decides whether a civil or criminal
contempt has been committed. Horn v. District Court, 647 P.2d 1368 (Wyo. 1982).
131

United Mine Workers of Am., Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Wyo.
1989) (quoting Anderson v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 660, 662 (Wyo. 1983)); see also Swain v. State, 220
P.3d 504, 508 (Wyo. 2009).
132
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A. Coercion for Civil Contempt
Civil contempt sanctions are intended to compel a party to
comply with a lawful court order. In essence, the contemnor
carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket, and can obtain
release by complying with the order of the court that sent him
there. Put another way, one held in civil contempt may usually
purge himself by compliance.133
Courts have the inherent power to enforce compliance with their orders
through civil contempt, including the ability to impose a penalty for contempt
“reasonably commensurate with the gravity of the offense, the social harm caused
by the defendant’s actions, and the objective of deterring such conduct in the
future.”134 The degree of punishment rendered lies within the court’s sound
discretion and may include incarceration.135 For example, one district court
properly “punished” a contemnor with forfeiture of his easement rights where that
individual used the road across another’s property in violation of court order.136
However, because the aim of civil contempt proceedings is to compel
compliance with a court’s order, “a court may not impose punishment when it is
clearly established that the alleged contemnor is unable to comply with the terms
of the order.”137 And, upon compliance with the court’s order, the contemnor is
purged of the contempt and the consequences must cease.138 The incarceration
of one found in contempt only until the contemnor has purged himself of such
contempt by complying with the court order is a decisive characteristic of civil
contempt.139 Better said, the contemnor is in a position to remove the contempt
by complying with the underlying order. Presumably to allow a contemnor
the keys to the jailhouse, Wyoming statute provides: “A person committed to
the county jail for contempt of court may be granted probation to continue
his employment[.]”140

133

Meckem v. Carter, 323 P.3d 637, 644 (Wyo. 2014) (citations omitted).

134

17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt § 195 (June 2014 update).

135

Id.

136

Stephens v. Lavitt, 239 P.3d 634 (Wyo. 2010).

Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2011) (citing Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S.
624, 638 n.9 (1988)).
137

138

Id.

139

17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt § 204 (June 2014 update).

140

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-504 (2013).
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Generally speaking, the trial court has discretion to craft a civil contempt
sanction for a contemnor’s disregard of provisions of its divorce decree.141 For
example, ordering a husband’s arrest and confinement, and conditioning his release
from confinement upon payment of temporary support arrearage, was within a
trial court’s authority to impose civil contempt sanctions in divorce action based
on husband’s failure to appear or to pay temporary support.142 Likewise, a wife’s
contempt, based on her spending money in violation of a temporary restraining
order in a divorce case was civil, not criminal, even though a requirement for
wife to purge the contempt was to pay attorney fees incurred by husband in the
contempt proceeding. This contempt categorization was correct because the basic
purpose of the contempt order was to remedy the harm done to husband, not to
protect the public.143
But a court must be cognizant of the extent of the imposed remedies in that
punitive discipline of an offending parent for violating custody provisions of a
divorce decree is not appropriate if it is in contravention of what may be in the
best interests of the child.144 Although not common, courts and practitioners
should be aware of any limitations in the fines or penalties provided by Wyoming
Statutes.145 Also, a court is somewhat limited in its abilities and jurisdiction based
upon the requested relief.146

B. Punishment for Criminal Contempt
On the other hand, criminal contempt is a punitive sanction designed to
support and defend a court’s authority vis-à-vis a person’s noncompliance with

Carbaugh v. Nichols, 315 P.3d 1175, 1179–80 (Wyo. 2014); Olsen v. Olsen, 310 P.3d
888 (Wyo. 2013); Roberts v. Locke, 304 P.3d 116 (Wyo. 2013); Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244
(Wyo. 1976).
141

142

Honan v. Honan, 809 P.2d 783 (Wyo. 1991).

Hamilton v. Hamilton, 228 P.3d 51 (Wyo. 2010). See also Walker v. Walker, 311 P.3d
170 (Wyo. 2013); Sims v. Day, 99 P.3d 964 (Wyo. 2004); Bickerstaff v. State (In re Interest of
Bickerstaff ), 950 P.2d 46 (Wyo. 1997); Ready v. Ready, 906 P.2d 382 (Wyo. 1995); Graham v.
Fenno, 734 P.2d 983 (Wyo. 1987); Hepp v. Hepp, 420 P.2d 118 (Wyo. 1966).
143

144

Rogers v. Rogers, 973 P.2d 1118 (Wyo. 1999).

Earthman v. Earthman, 476 P.2d 169 (Wyo. 1970). For example, Wyoming Statute
§ 14-3-438 limits a court’s ability to impose sanctions for contempt to a fine of not more than five
hundred dollars ($500.00) and/or incarceration of not more than ninety days.
145

Connors v. Connors, 769 P.2d 336 (Wyo. 1989) (finding trial court had no jurisdiction to
modify child support obligations when wife sought to have husband held in contempt for failing to
comply with his child support obligations but did not request support modification). See Shindell v.
Shindell, 322 P.3d 1270, 1277 (Wyo. 2014) (addressing the posting of a bond). See also Annotation,
Right Of Injured Party To Award Of Compensatory Damages Or Fine In Contempt Proceedings, 85
A.L.R.3d 895 (orig. pub. in 1978).
146
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a court order and, therefore, cannot be cured by the accused.147 A court has
the inherent power to punish contempt and the discretion to determine the
appropriate sanction.148 However, punishment for criminal contempt may not
exceed the criminal jurisdiction of the court.149 Further, any fine imposed must
inure to the benefit of the court and state, not a private litigant.150
Under federal law, federal courts historically were obligated to consider the
sentencing guidelines when imposing sentence by referring to the maximum
sentences for a crime that most closely equates to the charged contempt.151
Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 42.1 outlines non-exclusive coercive and
compensatory remedies available to the courts when punishing contempt.152 In
addition to the remedial sanctions allowed by court rule, the Wyoming Supreme
Court has recognized, for example, a district court’s discretionary authority
to declare a contemnor’s property access easement forfeited based upon that
individual’s violation of an injunction amounting to misuse of the easement.153
Thus, court rules and case law demonstrate that Wyoming courts generally hold
vast discretion when imposing punishment for criminal contempt.

C. A Mixed Bag: Confusion over the Results
“Where both criminal relief and civil relief are imposed in a contempt order,
the criminal feature is dominant and fixes the order’s character for purposes
of review.”154 Thus, the statute making the disobedience of an injunction a

147

See Swain v. State, 220 P.3d 504, 508 (Wyo. 2009).
[W]here the imprisonment is for a definite term, is mandatory, and release is not
conditioned upon the contemnor’s compliance with any order of the court, the
contempt is criminal in nature and the rights of due process attach. Unlike civil
contempt where the court’s exercise of its contempt authority is for the purpose of
compelling action on the part of the contemnor for the benefit of the complainant,
the purpose of imposing a criminal contempt sanction is to punish the contemnor
for his actions or disobedience with a lawful order of the court to vindicate the court
and its authority.

Connors, 769 P.2d at 344.
148

Stephens v. Lavitt, 239 P.3d 634, 639 (Wyo. 2010).

Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42(d). The author was unable to locate any case law that analyzed the
limitation on punishment as “not exceed[ing] the criminal jurisdiction of the court.” Wyoming
Rule 42(d) differs from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42 in this respect. See generally Fed. R.
Crim. P. 42. One might presume that this phrase limits a court’s punishment for contempt to the
greatest maximum punishment (by way of fines and/or incarceration) that it can impose for any
criminal proceeding properly within its jurisdiction.
149

150

Horn v. District Court, 647 P.2d 1368 (Wyo. 1982).

151

See 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt § 206 (June 2014 update).

152

See generally Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42.1.

153

Stephens, 239 P.3d at 640.

154

Horn v. Welch, 54 P.3d 754, 759 (Wyo. 2002).
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contemptuous act is both remedial and punitive in that it authorizes the restitution
to the injured party and security for obedience to the injunction, as well as
the imposition of a fine for the county’s use.155 For example, a contempt order
ultimately was considered criminal where it held a labor union and its members
in contempt for blocking a highway; impeding travel of employer’s employees
to a mine; and damaging the employer’s property in violation of preliminary
injunction.156 This result held true although the proceeding was initiated by the
employer and initially characterized by the trial court as civil contempt. Of note,
the criminal characterization was recognized where the court awarded damages
of over $6,700 to the employer, assessed attorney fees, and imposed a fine of
$100 on each individual union member.157 Frankly, any time a court considers
incarceration as an option for coercion or punishment, it should be keenly aware of
travelling down that precarious road. For example, disobedience of an injunction
may be punished as a contempt, and the contemnor fined and compelled to make
restitution. Going one step further, however, the contemnor may be imprisoned
for nonpayment of said fine, but not for nonpayment of costs.158
Recently, the Wyoming Supreme Court reiterated the authority of a court to
order compensation of an aggrieved party for damages caused by a contemnor’s
failure to comply with court order, noting that options include the award of a
judgment for money damages as a compensatory contempt sanction, so long as the
compensatory award was based on actual loss.159 Failure to craft the compensatory
award to actual losses suffered by the aggrieved party, and order them paid to that
party, would result in a speculative and arbitrary award, as specifically noted:
The penalty imposed here cannot be considered compensatory,
as it is to be paid to the court. We must determine whether
the penalty is really a fine, which would only be appropriate in
criminal contempt. After reviewing our precedent, we answer
that question in the affirmative; that is, the purpose of the $100
a day penalty could only have been to punish Appellants if they
do not remove the obstructions, although it would certainly
have had a coercive effect.
This contempt proceeding was unquestionably civil in nature.
While the penalty of $100 per day payable to the court until
the obstructions were removed might have been a fitting fine
155

Porter v. State, 92 P. 385 (Wyo. 1907).

United Mine Workers of Am., Local 1972 v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274
(Wyo. 1989).
156

157

Id.

158

Porter, 92 P. at 387.

Meckem v. Carter, 323 P.3d 637, 645– 46 (Wyo. 2014). See also Walker v. Walker, 311 P.3d
170, 178 (Wyo. 2013); Walters v. Walters, 249 P.3d 214, 229 (Wyo. 2011).
159
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for criminal contempt, it is not an appropriate sanction for
civil contempt. . . . The district court was therefore without
jurisdiction to impose the fine as it did.160
Although it found the trial court’s immediate action without jurisdiction in
Meckem v. Carter, the Wyoming Supreme Court also reminded courts that, if
the contemnor continued in willful disobedience of court order, then the court
had continuing coercive measures available to it, including incarceration.161 This
decision is an appropriate reminder of the factors necessary to determine whether
a contempt is civil or criminal in nature; hence, the results are cyclical in nature.162

VII. Defenses
Having established the elements required to prove contempt, whether civil
or criminal in nature, it quickly becomes apparent that the defenses available
to an alleged contemnor largely mirror the proof of the elements required to
prove the claimed contempt, with the addition of the inability to abide by the
court’s order.163
In Shindell v. Shindell,164 an alleged contemnor (Mother) argued she could
not be held in contempt of court for failure to abide by court order requiring her
to pay the children’s travel expenses when she could not afford to do so.165 The
Court responded:
In the present case, other than stating in her brief that she
receives government assistance because she only earns $15,000
per year, Mother does not provide any support for her claim
that the limited travel expenses are beyond her capabilities. Her
brief does include a citation to the record for the information
regarding her resources, but the page number cited is not part
160

Meckem v. Carter, 323 P.3d 637, 645–46 (Wyo. 2014) (citations omitted).

161

Id.

162

In determining whether a contempt is criminal or civil, a reviewing court must consider:
1.

In what manner did the contempt happen, that is, did the contemnor refuse to
do an affirmative act or did the contemnor do that which he was ordered not
to do;

2.

What was the substance of the proceeding;

3.

What kind of punishment was imposed; and

4.

For what reasons did the court impose that kind of punishment.

Stephens v. Lavitt, 239 P.3d 634, 638 (Wyo. 2010) (citing Munoz v. Munoz, 39 P.3d 390, 393
(Wyo. 2002)).
163

Carbaugh v. Nichols, 315 P.3d 1175, 1179–80 (Wyo. 2014).

164

322 P.3d 1270 (Wyo. 2014).

165

Id. at 1276–77.
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of the record on appeal. Consequently, there is no factual basis
to support her claim that she could not afford to pay the girls’
travel expenses. On this record, the district court did not abuse
its discretion by requiring Mother, as part of the sanctions for
her contempt, to pay the girls’ travel expenses for winter break
2012–13 and spring break 2013.166
However, where an individual is able to demonstrate an inability to comply with
the court order, contempt is not proper.167
Still, a contemnor cannot rely upon post-order facts and circumstances to
defend against contempt proceedings, unless those facts establish the inability to
comply with the court’s order. More specifically, the Wyoming Supreme Court
recognized that facts arising subsequent to issuance of divorce decree may render
modification of such decree proper, but such facts could not be interposed as
defense in related contempt proceedings.168
Additionally, contempt carries with it an element of intent, a mens rea, so to
speak, such that the mere fact that a litigant fails to comply with a court’s directives
does not equate, per se, to a finding of contempt of court, particularly where the
conduct does not indicate a flagrant disregard of the individual’s obligations.169
Consequently, before a court can hold the accused in contempt of court, it must
consider whether the proper intent was proved and whether the complained-of
acts actually obstructed the proceedings.170

VIII. Constitutional Considerations
Perhaps the most obvious defense to contempt allegations lies post-adjudication
in an indirect attack based upon constitutional violations. The authority to
exercise contempt powers is well established, both in statutory and case law, but
this authority carries with it certain procedural constitutional considerations
that must be addressed simultaneously. Although often not obvious until after
a finding of contempt has been imposed, courts and practitioners should be
cognizant of constitutional considerations that could affect the validity of an
order of contempt of court. By no means an exhaustive analysis of constitutional
issues surrounding contempt proceedings, the key points discussed below should
alert courts and practitioners of particularly hot topics of which to be wary.
166

Id.

Secrest v. Secrest, 781 P.2d 1339 (Wyo. 1989) (finding that father was not in contempt for
failure to comply with child support order based on evidence that father was financially unable to
comply with court’s previous orders); Carbaugh, 315 P.3d at 1179–80.
167

168

Weppner v. Weppner, 319 P.2d 127 (Wyo. 1957).

169

Salmeri v. Salmeri, 554 P.2d 1244 (Wyo. 1976).

170

Horn v. District Court, 647 P.2d 1368 (Wyo. 1982).
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A. Jurisdiction (Personal and Subject Matter)
Jurisdictional considerations, both personal and subject matter, tend to be
less an immediate concern in contempt proceedings, largely because the court
generally already has jurisdiction over the litigants as part of the underlying
proceedings from which the contempt originated.171 But, when courts reach
beyond those immediate participants, jurisdiction can become an issue. Of
course, a court’s jurisdiction, or lack thereof, over the subject matter and the
person is reviewable upon appeal.172
For example, in one case, a juvenile court lacked personal jurisdiction over a
female minor’s boyfriend, who was never ordered to appear and never made party
to the juvenile proceeding. The court’s temporary restraining and protection order
issued against the boyfriend was void.173 As a result, the juvenile court lacked
authority to hold the boyfriend in contempt for violation of that court order, and
the court’s issuance of a temporary restraining and protection order against the
boyfriend violated his due process right.174 Similarly, where there was a failure of
service (of the order to show cause) on an alleged contemnor, the court lacked
jurisdiction to hold the subsequent contempt proceedings.175 Such failure can
be cured, or waived, where the defendant voluntarily submits to the order of the
court to show cause and appears in person without questioning the jurisdiction.176

B. Due Process
“[T]he due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and Art. 1, [Section] 6 of the Wyoming Constitution
guarantee a criminal defendant the right to due process of law.”177 More specifically,
article 1, section 6 of the Wyoming Constitution provides: “No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”178 Procedural due
process considerations have been at the forefront of contempt proceedings insofar
as the court’s ability to deprive the contemnor of liberty or property.
A court stands on solid ground vis-à-vis constitutional procedural due process
concerns where it adequately informs the contemnor of the nature and effect of
Notably, where a suit was removed to federal court, the district court lacked jurisdiction
to enter a contempt order at a later date, even though the basis for the order occurred prior to the
removal. Garber v. United Mine Workers of Am., 524 P.2d 578 (Wyo. 1974).
171

172

Ex parte Bergman, 26 P. 914 (Wyo. 1890).

173

KT v. State (In re Interest of BLM), 902 P.2d 1288 (Wyo. 1995).

174

Id.

175

See Oedekoven v. Oedekoven, 475 P.2d 307 (Wyo. 1970).

176

Bergman, 26 P. at 919.

177

West v. State, 311 P.3d 157, 161 (Wyo. 2013).

178

Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6.
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the finding of contempt but runs afoul when it fails to clearly apprise an individual
of the basis for contempt.179 It should be noted that a juvenile court exceeded
its authority and violated a juvenile’s due process right where the juvenile was
not informed that she could be declared a delinquent child and placed in the
Wyoming Girls’ School for an indefinite period for failure to comply with the
court’s orders.180 This case goes as much to the fatal notions of jurisdiction as it
does due process. Regardless, the results are noteworthy. So long as the participants
follow the procedures outlined in this article with respect to the various forms of
contempt, most procedural due process issues can be avoided.

C. Right to Jury Trial
An alleged contemnor’s right to a jury trial has been a significant topic,
particularly given the possibility of a period of incarceration in both civil and
criminal contempt proceedings. In a civil contempt proceeding, the contemnor
has no right to a jury trial.181 This concept underlines the notion that, in civil
contempt proceedings, “the contemnor carries the keys of his prison in his own
pocket.”182 Meanwhile, in criminal contempt proceedings, the right to a jury
trial hinges on the possibility of incarceration, just as it does in other criminal
matters. The alleged criminal nature of the contempt proceedings, or possibility
of enforcing the court order through contempt proceedings, does not, in and of
itself, give an alleged contemnor a constitutional right to a jury trial.183 Rather,
in cases of criminal contempt, jury trial is required only if the party guilty of
contempt is exposed to the possibility of confinement for more than six months.184

D. Right to Counsel: Private and/or Court-Appointed
Historically, the Wyoming Supreme Court declined to address whether an
indigent litigant in a civil contempt case is entitled to appointed counsel when

179
In re Contempt of Haselhuhn, 740 P.2d 387 (Wyo. 1987). See also Osborn v. Manning,
812 P.2d 545 (Wyo. 1991); Weiss v. State ex rel. Cardine, 455 P.2d 904 (Wyo. 1969), cert. denied
398 U.S. 927 (1970).
180
TLL v. State (In re Interest of TLL), 899 P.2d 44 (Wyo. 1995) (further discussing the lack
of contempt petition that stated jurisdictional facts).
181
17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt § 179 (June 2014 update) (“Civil contempt proceedings resulting
in conditional imprisonment, based on the offender’s continued defiance of a court order, do not
require a jury trial, even where the resulting imprisonment is relatively long, so long as the defendant
would be released upon ceasing contempt.”).
182

Swain v. State, 220 P.3d 504, 508 (Wyo. 2009) (internal citation omitted).

LP v. Natrona Cnty. Dep’t. of Pub. Assistance & Soc. Servs. (In re GP), 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo.
1984); Weiss v. State ex rel. Cardine, 455 P.2d 904 (Wyo. 1969), cert. denied 398 U.S. 927 (1970).
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Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42(e); see also Skinner v. State, 838 P.2d 715, 722 (Wyo. 1992); 17 Am.
Jur. 2d Contempt § 179 (June 2014 update).
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incarceration is a possible penalty.185 The United States Supreme Court relatively
recently considered an indigent’s right to paid counsel.186 Carefully limiting its
holding to civil contempt proceedings involving an indigent individual who is
subject to a child support order for arrears owed to a custodial parent,187 the
Court concluded that the Due Process Clause “does not automatically require the
provision of counsel[.]”188 However, in finding that the provision of counsel was
not required, the Court relied heavily upon the notion of “substitute procedural
safeguards,” including:
(1) notice to the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a critical
issue in the contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or
the equivalent) to elicit relevant financial information; (3) an
opportunity at the hearing for the defendant to respond to
statements and questions about his financial status, (e.g., those
triggered by his responses on the form); and (4) an express
finding by the court that the defendant has the ability to pay.189
The Court noted that these suggestions are not the “only possible alternatives,”
and assistance, other than purely legal assistance, sometimes can prove constitu
tionally sufficient.190
In response to Turner v. Rogers, the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed the
issue of an indigent defendant’s right to court-appointed counsel in criminal
contempt cases, noting it does not apply to civil contempt proceedings.191 In
Department of Family Services v. Currier,192 the court thereafter noted that
sufficient substitute procedural safeguards to protect indigent obligors against the
possibility of wrongful incarceration were in place, and, therefore, due process
did not require appointment of counsel for an indigent obligor in civil contempt
proceedings for non-payment of child support brought by Department of Family
Services (DFS). The court noted that, although incarceration was a possibility

185

GGV v. JLR, 105 P.3d 474 (Wyo. 2005).

186

See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).

The Court specifically noted that it did “not address civil contempt proceedings where the
underlying child support payment is owed to the State, for example, for reimbursement of welfare funds
paid to the parent with custody.” Id. at 2520. The Court also specifically excluded from its holding the
“unusually complex case where a defendant can fairly be represented only by a trained advocate.” Id.
(quotation omitted).
187

188

Id. (emphasis in original).

189

Id. at 2519.

190

Id.

191

State, Dept. of Family Servs. v. Currier, 295 P.3d 837 (Wyo. 2013).

192

Id.
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and DFS was represented by counsel, the procedure employed in the contempt
proceedings for failure to pay child support provided the obligor with notice and
the opportunity to be heard; that provision of counsel in every case involving the
state and an indigent obligor would have resulted in considerable delay; and that
the obligor who was unable to pay child support had the obligation and means to
seek modification of obligation.193 Because of its import, it is worth parsing the
court’s analysis.
The Wyoming Supreme Court first noted that the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution guarantees indigent defendants the right to appointed
counsel in criminal cases, including criminal contempt proceedings, but does not
apply in civil cases.194 The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process
does, however, apply to civil contempt actions. In that context, a Fourteenth
Amendment right to counsel in civil proceedings has been recognized when an
indigent litigant risks being deprived of his liberty, but not in every instance.195
The Wyoming Supreme Court noted the applicability of the Matthews 196 factors
to address the specific safeguards the constitutional Due Process Clause required
to make a civil proceeding fundamentally fair, namely: (1) the nature of the private
interest that will be affected; (2) the comparative risk of an erroneous deprivation
of that interest with and without additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and (3) the nature and magnitude of any countervailing interest in not providing
additional or substitute procedural requirements.197 It then turned its focus to the
United State Supreme Court’s application of those factors:
Applying the Mathews factors to Turner’s situation, the Court
concluded the first factor, “the private interest that will be
affected,” argued strongly in favor of a right to counsel because
that interest involves the possibility of loss of personal liberty
by imprisonment. Due to the importance of the interest, it is
critical to ensure accurate decision making with regard to the
key “ability to pay” question because the answer ultimately
determines whether the matter is civil or criminal in nature
and whether the obligor will be held in contempt of court.
Nevertheless, the Court stated that due process does not always
require the appointment of counsel in civil proceedings even
when incarceration is threatened and the opposing interests

193

Id.

194

Id. at 840–44 (emphasis added).

195

Id.

196

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976).

State, Dept. of Family Servs. v. Currier, 295 P.3d 837, 840–41 (Wyo. 2013) (referencing
Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2517–18; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 893).
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and the value of providing additional or substitute procedural
safeguards must be considered.198
The Wyoming Supreme Court expressly considered the three considerations,
addressed in Turner, that influence a required appointment of counsel: (1) the
defendant’s ability to pay; (2) legal representation (or lack thereof ) of the opposing
party; and (3) any availability of “substitute procedural safeguards” that reduce
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty.199
Those [substitute procedural] safeguards include (1) notice to
the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a critical issue in the
contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the equivalent)
to elicit relevant financial information; (3) an opportunity at the
hearing for the defendant to respond to statements and questions
about his financial status, (e.g., those triggered by his responses
on the form); and (4) an express finding by the court that the
defendant has the ability to pay.200
After considering these factors, the result is such that that “the Due Process
Clause does not automatically require the provision of counsel at civil contempt
proceedings to an indigent individual who is subject to a child support order, even
if that individual faces incarceration (for up to a year).”201 With that precedent
in place, the Wyoming Supreme Court noted that Turner expressly failed to
address civil contempt proceedings where child support payments are owed to the
government.202 The court expressed its concern that “those proceedings resemble
debt-collection proceedings and the government is likely to have representation,”
creating a potentially larger imbalance between the parties.203 As a result, the
Wyoming Supreme Court launched into a de novo analysis of the Mathews factors.
Regarding the first factor, the private interest to be affected, the Wyoming
Supreme Court expressed that the obligor-father’s personal liberty would likely be
affected by the contempt proceedings in that the Department of Family Services
(DFS) sought any appropriate remedy for contempt, including imposition of a
jail sentence. In concluding that this factor was strongly indicative of a right to
198

Currier, 295 P.3d at 841 (citations omitted).

199

Id.

Id. (quoting Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2518–19 (2011)) (citations omitted)
(emphasis in original).
200

201

Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520 (emphasis in original).

Currier, 295 P.3d at 842– 43 (Wyo. 2013) (emphasis added). See also Marjorie A. Caner,
J.D., Annotation, Right to Appointment of Counsel in Contempt Proceedings, 32 A.L.R.5th 31 (1995);
Jack W. Shaw, Jr., J.D., Annotation, Right to Counsel in Contempt Proceedings, 52 A.L.R.3d 1002
(1973 and Supp. 2004).
202

203

Currier, 295 P.3d at 842–43 (Wyo. 2013).
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counsel, the court opined that “the freedom from bodily restraint lies at the core
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”204 Addressing the second
factor, the comparative risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest,
with and without safeguards, the court placed particular importance on the fact
that DFS was represented by counsel when the obligor-father was not, noting:
This factor implicates the key “ability to pay” question which
is often dispositive in these matters. The ability to comply with
the court-ordered support requirement marks the dividing line
between criminal and civil contempt and an incorrect decision
could increase the likelihood of a wrongful incarceration by
depriving the defendant of the procedural protections (including
counsel) that the Constitution would demand in criminal
proceedings. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-310 (LexisNexis 2011)
codifies the ability to pay requirement by requiring a showing
that the parent has “willfully” violated a child support order. In
Secrest v. Secrest, we held unrefuted evidence that the father was
financially unable to comply with the court’s previous orders
regarding the child’s medical and insurance expenses justified
finding him not in contempt of court.
The district court concluded in this case that, because DFS
was represented, failing to provide counsel to Father would result
in an asymmetry that would make the proceeding unfair. Turner,
by contrast, involved two unrepresented parties and concluded
that allowing counsel would create an asymmetry of representation
that would alter significantly the nature of proceeding. We agree
that an asymmetry exists when DFS is represented and the obligor
is not; however, Turner and Mathews envision a balancing of
the opposing interests and procedural safeguards. Consequently,
the fact that DFS was represented is not dispositive. We must
consider what procedures are in place or may be put in place to
offset the lack of symmetry occasioned by DFS being represented
while the obligor is not to determine the comparative risk of
erroneous incarceration.205
The court then considered the procedures employed by Wyoming courts in
contempt proceedings for failure to pay child support, recognizing that an alleged
contemnor is informed, both in the petition and by the court, of the burden on
the State to prove that the failure to pay court-ordered child support is willful

204

Id. (citations omitted).

205

Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and that the alleged contemnor is given an opportunity to explain any reasons for
failure to pay child support.206 The court opined:
These procedures meet the notice and opportunity to be heard
requirements set out in Turner. Given those procedures, it is
hard to imagine what more appointed counsel could bring to
the dialogue. In addition, district courts should utilize less
formal courtroom procedures to give a pro se obligor a full
opportunity to present a defense on the ability to pay issue.
Such accommodations are encouraged in the Wyoming Code
of Judicial Conduct: “It is not a violation of [the rule requiring
judges to uphold and apply the law and perform all duties fairly
and impartially] for a judge to make reasonable accommodations
to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters
fairly heard.” The district court must also make an express
finding as to the obligor’s ability to pay in order to determine
whether the failure is willful or not. These safeguards weigh
against requiring the appointment of counsel.207
Finally, the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed the third Mathews factor,
which requires consideration of the countervailing interest in not providing
the additional safeguards, including the appointment of counsel. The court
recognized the delay in proceedings that would be directly caused by requiring the
appointment of counsel in every case involving the state and an indigent obligor
and commented on the indirect results flowing therefrom: slowing payments
to needy families, undermining the overall fairness of the proceedings, and the
considerable fiscal and administrative burden to the state.208
Ultimately, the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that, the procedural
safeguards and the disadvantages of providing counsel outweigh the lack of
symmetry occasioned by the Wyoming Department of Family Services being
represented while the obligor is not. Thus, indigent obligors are not entitled to
court-appointed counsel in child support enforcement contempt proceedings,
so long as certain procedural safeguards are available. The court left room for
the possibility of due process requiring appointment of counsel in an “unusually
complex case where a defendant can fairly be represented only by a trained
advocate.”209 In the context of civil contempt, then, the issue of the right to
counsel is determined in Wyoming as follows: the contemnor must be afforded a
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Id.

207

Id.

208

Id. (citations omitted).
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Id. at 844 (quoting Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520).
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reasonable opportunity to employ counsel if desired, but the right to appointed
counsel is not recognized except, perhaps, in situations of an unusually complex
nature where a defendant can only be fairly and adequately represented by counsel.
On the other hand, concerning criminal contempt, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that an indigent defendant subject to criminal
contempt proceedings (other than summary proceedings) has a right to appointed
counsel.210 However, in contrast to the due process protections generally
afforded a criminal defendant, the law also recognizes that a judge may punish
a contemnor “summarily” if the judge saw or heard the conduct constituting
the direct contempt.211 “One charged with committing a direct contempt in
the presence of the court is not generally entitled to be heard in his or her own
defense; no constitutional rights are infringed by refusing a hearing and punishing
summarily.”212 “Where a direct contempt occurs in the presence of the court,
the court should usually act promptly to impose sanctions.”213 But, if the court
delays in imposing punishment, then “[d]ue process requires that the contemnor’s
rights to notice and a hearing be respected[.]”214 Thus, in criminal contempt
proceedings, an alleged contemnor has a right to counsel for indirect criminal
contempt but not for summary proceedings related to direct criminal contempt.

E. Double Jeopardy
On occasion, an alleged contemnor has raised constitutional double jeopardy
concerns worthy of discussing here. The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article 1, section 11 of the Wyoming Constitution protect a
person from twice being put in jeopardy of prosecution, conviction, or punishment
for the same criminal offense.215

210
See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2516 (citing United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993);
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925)).

Wyo. R. Crim. P. 42(b); see also 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt §§ 169, 193 (June 2014 update);
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-21-904 (2011) (allowing summary proceedings in circuit courts).
211

212

17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt § 170 (June 2014 update).

Id. “When a direct contempt is committed in the immediate presence of the court,
summary adjudication without pleading, affidavit, or formal charges is constitutionally permissible.
When the misconduct occurs in open court, the affront to the court’s dignity is widely observed,
justifying summary contempt procedures.” Id. § 191.
213

214
215

Id. § 170.
Wyoming’s version of the double jeopardy clause states:
No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case, nor shall
any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If a jury disagree, or if the
judgment be arrested after a verdict, or if the judgment be reversed for error in law,
the accused shall not be deemed to have been in jeopardy.

Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 11.
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Though the two provisions differ in language, this Court has
stated, they have the same meaning and are co-extensive in
application. Furthermore, we have said that the double jeopardy
provisions of both Constitutions provide an accused three
protections: 1) protection against a second prosecution for the
same offense following an acquittal; 2) protection against a
second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction; and
3) protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.
The protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause by its terms
applies only if there has been some event, such as an acquittal,
which terminates the original jeopardy. For double jeopardy to
bar re-trial in a case where the district court grants a defense
motion for a mistrial based upon prosecutorial misconduct, the
defense must show prosecutorial intent to goad the defense into
moving for a mistrial.216
Specifically applied to contempt proceedings, the Wyoming Supreme
Court declared an alleged contemnor’s constitutional protection against double
jeopardy was not violated by proceedings to hold him in contempt for failure to
pay child support a second time, even though the second contempt proceeding
overlapped the timeframe of the first criminal contempt conviction, and the
alleged contemnor was afforded protections and advisements provided by rules of
criminal procedure.217 In Munoz v. Munoz, the second contempt proceeding was
initiated by the State because a noncustodial parent did not pay child support in
accordance with the district court’s earlier order; thus, the alleged contemptuous
conduct was father’s refusal to perform an affirmative act such that the intent of
proceedings was to force the father to comply with the child support order rather
than to punish him for noncompliance.218

F. Cruel, Unusual, and/or Excessive Punishment
An initial analysis of general Eighth Amendment consideration, including
a comparison and contrast of state and federal constitutional law, is appropriate
before narrowing the scope to contempt proceedings. The Eighth Amendment
states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.”219 “To determine whether a punishment is
cruel and unusual, courts must look beyond historical conceptions to the evolving

216
Derrera v. State, 327 P.3d 107 (Wyo. 2014) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Landeroz v. State, 267 P.3d 1075, 1080 (Wyo. 2011).
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Munoz v. Munoz, 39 P.3d 390 (Wyo. 2002).
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U.S. Const, 8th Amend.
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standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”220 This
approach is necessary because the standard of extreme cruelty necessarily embodies
a moral judgment, that application of which changes along with the basic mores of
society.221 The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the imposition
of “inherently barbaric punishments” under all circumstances under the notion
the human attributes of even of those who have committed serious crimes must
be respected.222 On a more limited basis, the Clause also forbids punishments that
are disproportionate to the crime.223 The concept of proportionality is central to
the Eighth Amendment under the principle of jurisprudence that punishment for
crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense.224
In contrast,
Article 1, § 14 of the Wyoming Constitution provides: “All
persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for
capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption
great. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishment be inflicted.”
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
Our state constitution articulates the standard in the disjunctive and the federal constitution in the conjunctive. We have at
least tacitly recognized that under our state constitution we will
look at the two words individually.225
Applying those notions of cruel or unusual punishment, or excessive fines,
specifically to a contempt proceeding, Wyoming courts have held that a sentence
of six months’ imprisonment and $500 fine for contempt in attempting to bribe
witnesses in presence of court was not so disproportionate to offense and so cruel
and excessive as to render it unconstitutional.226 Ultimately, where the court that
imposed the contempt sentence has jurisdiction in other respects, the sentence

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S. Ct. 285, 290 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101, 78 S. Ct. 590, 598 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
220

Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008) (quoting Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 382, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2800 (1972) (Burger, C.J, dissenting)).
221
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Tucker v. State, 245 P.3d 301, 314 (Wyo. 2010).
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Id.

224

Tucker v. State, 245 P.3d 301, 314 (Wyo. 2010).

Bear Cloud v. State, 275 P.3d 377, 396 (Wyo. 2012), cert. granted and judgment vacated,
Bear Cloud v. Wyoming, 133 S. Ct. 183 (2012) (emphasis added) (quoting Johnson v. State, 2003
WY 9, ¶ 35, 61 P.3d 1234, 1248 (Wyo. 2003).
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See Fisher v. McDaniel, 64 P. 1056 (Wyo. 1901).
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must be so excessive as to clearly violate constitutional provision against cruel
and unusual punishment, and thus utterly void, before a reviewing court can and
should interfere.227

G. First Amendment: Freedom of Speech
As may well be anticipated, where an individual is held in contempt of court,
civil or criminal, based on a choice to speak, freedom of speech issues surface. The
Wyoming Constitution recognizes that:
Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects,
being responsible for the abuse of that right; and in all trials
for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, when published
with good intent and [for] justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient
defense, the jury having the right to determine the facts and the
law, under direction of the court.228
In contempt proceedings in Wyoming, writings, which were executed by
defendant-contemnor and sent to Wyoming Supreme Court by him, were deemed
admissible as relating to the alleged contempt.229 These writings were admissible
solely as they related to continuity and perspective of defendant’s acts; the intent
of the defendant; and his present sincerity or lack of sincerity in purported
apology to the Wyoming Supreme Court, and not as to the gravamen of the
alleged contempt.230 Thus, the court could rely upon these remarks in finding the
defendant-contemnor guilty of direct contempt without violating his rights to
freedom of speech and freedom of press.231

IX. Judicial Review: Issues of Appealability
Finally, appellate review of contempt proceedings is inevitable. The Wyoming
Supreme Court has addressed the ability to appeal a civil contempt order.232
Noting that, “a majority of courts hold that when contempt proceedings are
brought[,] any order short of the order which imposes punishment by fine or
imprisonment is interlocutory in nature, and is not a final order from which an
appeal can be taken[,]” the court followed suit.233 This holding signifies that a
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Id.
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Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 20.
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In re Stone, 305 P.2d 777 (Wyo. 1957).
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See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 228 P.3d 51, 54–55 (Wyo. 2010).
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court’s finding of civil contempt is not appealable unless and until the punishment
has been imposed. “[T]he significant question is whether the punishment has
been imposed, not whether a finding of contempt has been made.”234 To that end,
the Wyoming Supreme Court has opined:
Father argues this aspect of the district court’s order is not
appealable because the district court has not ordered Mother to
pay a specific amount of travel expenses. In Inman, we noted that
WRAP 1.05(b) allows appeal of orders affecting a substantial
right made in a special proceeding. Given the district court’s
continuing jurisdiction over divorce matters and its general
power to enforce its orders through contempt proceedings, the
order requiring Mother to pay the girls’ travel expenses affects a
substantial right. The reasonableness of Father’s expenses can be
determined in a later proceeding, if necessary.235
An order of contempt is a final order, and therefore reviewable.236 Not only
the contemnor, but also the party in whose favor an order has been granted,
has the right to appeal from an order adjudging an alleged violator not to be
in contempt.237
Once that contempt order has been entered, the appellate court applies an
“abuse of discretion” standard238 to its review of the contempt proceedings. The
inherent power to punish contempt of court is firmly vested in a district court’s
broad discretion will not be intruded upon unless the court commits a clear and
grave abuse of that discretion. In determining whether the district court abused
its discretion, the appellate court considers whether the district court could have
reasonably concluded as it did.239
Still, the court also recognized that reversal may be warranted in cases of
“serious procedural error, a violation of a principle of law, or a clear and grave
abuse of discretion.”240 However, mere errors of law in imposing a sentence for
contempt, which do not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court, will not be
reviewed on habeas corpus.241 Ultimately, in reviewing the exercise of a district
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Id.
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Shindell v. Shindell, 322 P.3d 1270, 1277 n.1 (Wyo. 2014).

Porter v. State, 92 P. 385, 387 (Wyo. 1907); Laramie Nat’l Bank v. Steinhoff, 53 P. 299
(Wyo. 1898).
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Laramie Nat’l Bank, 53 P. at 299.
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Olsen v. Olsen, 310 P.3d 888, 896 (Wyo. 2013).
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Meckem v. Carter, 323 P.3d 637, 644 (Wyo. 2014) (emphasis added).
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Shindell, 322 P.3d at 1273 (citing Roberts v. Locke, 304 P.3d 116, 120 (Wyo. 2013)).
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Fisher v. McDaniel, 64 P. 1056 (Wyo. 1901); Ex parte Bergman, 26 P. 914 (Wyo. 1890).
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court’s broad discretion under its contempt powers, the appellate court generally
must determine whether the trial court reasonably could have concluded as
it did.242
In the criminal contempt context, the court has stated that criminal contempt
is the only common-law crime not abolished by statute, thereby requiring the State
to carry the burden of proving every element of a charge of criminal contempt
beyond a reasonable doubt.243 Likewise, the standard of review of sufficiency of
the evidence is well established:
[W]e examine and accept as true the State’s evidence and all
reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it. We do not
consider conflicting evidence presented by the defendant. We do
not substitute our judgment for that of the jury [or fact-finder];
rather, we determine whether a jury [or fact-finder] could
have reasonably concluded each of the elements of the crime
was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard applies
whether the supporting evidence is direct or circumstantial.244
Thus, because criminal contempt is considered a crime, it is subject to the
same review, and standards therefor, as would be anticipated of any appellate
review of criminal proceedings. Courts and practitioners should govern
themselves accordingly. So long as courts abide by the procedural and substantive
cautions outlined in this article, appellate review should be of little concern, as the
Wyoming Supreme Court has consistently recognized the trial courts’ need, and
ability, to enforce court orders.245

X. Conclusion
Unfortunately, contempt continues to be a necessary device for courts to
govern the conduct of those appearing before the court and to enforce court
orders. Happily, however, developments in case and statutory law have clarified
the authority of the courts, the procedures to be utilized, and the extent of the
remedies available to them.
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Fisher, 64 P. at 1056; See also Stephens v. Lavitt, 239 P.3d 634, 639 (Wyo. 2010).

Weidt v. State, 312 P.3d 1035, 1040 (Wyo. 2013). See also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-102(a)
(2013); BW v. State (In re Interest of BD), 226 P.3d 272, 273 (Wyo. 2010); Swain v. State, 220 P.3d
504, 508 (Wyo. 2009); ELR v. State (In re Interest of EWR), 902 P.2d 696, 700 (Wyo. 1995); Witt
v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 143 (Wyo. 1995).
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Weidt, 312 P.3d at 1040 (quoting Sweets v. State, 307 P.3d 860, 865 (Wyo. 2013)).
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See, e.g., Weidt, 312 P.3d at 1040 n.3; Walker v Walker, 311 P.3d 170, 178 (Wyo. 2013).
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With any luck or skill, this article has provided those appearing in Wyoming
courts with a better understanding of the definitions applicable to contempt
proceedings, the procedures required therein, the elements and defenses applicable
to contempt proceedings, the remedies available, the various constitutional
considerations, and the appropriate appellate review of civil and criminal contempt
matters. With these useful tools in place, courts can uphold the integrity and
decorum of the justice system in the manner in which all those who participate in
it deserve.
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